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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Brazil is witnessing a “tussle for the Amazon”—a
new and deadly phase in the history of its
organized crime groups and their operations.
While the country is no stranger to violent
criminal organizations, recent years have seen
groups building increasingly sophisticated
networks, both within and beyond Brazil’s
borders. In the strategic state of Amazonas,
these developments have sparked a power
struggle between several of the country’s largest
criminal organizations that has concerning
implications for the stability of Brazil as a whole.
Three major groups currently vie for power. The
most known is the First Capital Command (Primeiro Comando da Capital or PCC), which has
experienced rapid growth and claims an estimated 30,000 members nationwide. The PCC’s
rise has provoked anxiety among the leadership
of the second most important player, Brazil’s
Red Command (Comando Vermelho or CV). One
of Brazil’s oldest and most entrenched criminal
organizations, the CV has waged war on the PCC
throughout the country, contributing to several
notable upticks in homicide rates. A third group,
the Northern Family (Família Do Norte or FDN),
has asserted itself in its traditional sphere of influence, i.e., controlling illicit activity in Amazonas state as an ally of the CV. With its erstwhile
alliance in tatters, the FDN is squeezed between
the CV and the PCC as they battle for control
of Amazonas state. The contest between rising
and established criminal organizations—and
the many local proxy groups they spawn—lies
at the root of the transformation of Brazil’s organized crime landscape.
While this shift has been localized in Amazonas state, its effects have not been confined
to that particular geographic area. Facing intense pressure to grow and compete, Brazilian
criminal groups have expanded their operations
throughout Latin America and beyond, especially in Lusophone Africa and Western Europe,
where lucrative drug markets help fund the
groups’ competition back home.
Five main attributes contribute to the Amazon’s
strategic importance for criminal groups in Brazil, and all five also relate to the aforementioned
“internationalization” of Brazilian organized
crime groups.

3

1) The lucrative Solimões route to the Atlantic
The Solimões network of rivers provides
drug traffickers with an easy and poorly
policed transport system between neighboring countries as well as an outlet for
cross-continental distribution via the Atlantic Ocean.
2) Access to the triple border with Colombia
and Peru: The largest coca producers in
the world
While Brazil produces neither cocaine nor
its precursors, Brazilian criminal organizations are intimately involved in the movement of illicit narcotics, making access to
coca suppliers essential.
3) The “Rota Caipira” of the south is increasingly consolidated and dominated
by the PCC
From the PCC’s fortified home base in São
Paulo, it has developed transnational aspirations. As part of this strategy, the group
has increased its cross-border presence in
Bolivia and Paraguay, where it has embedded itself in the supply chains of various illicit economies and recruited new members
within foreign prison systems. This has led
competing groups to look for similar trafficking routes to dominate.
4) Ungoverned spaces abound in the Amazon
The physical features of the Amazon region,
coupled with Brazil’s current capabilities,
frustrate any state efforts to assert control.
Thus, in several locations, criminal groups
compete to supplant the state as a guarantor of security and governance.
5) Market diversification: From drugs to illegal mining, deforestation, and wildlife
trafficking
The abundance of natural resources in
the Amazon region affords criminal groups
valuable and diverse new sources of revenue, incentivizing Brazil’s criminal organizations to fight for the ability to monopolize
these illicit markets.
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The “tussle for the Amazon” is more than a mere
clash between Brazil’s transnational organized
crime groups. It is a threat to regional stability and imperils neighboring Latin American
countries. Appreciating the Amazon region’s
current role in the dynamics of Brazil’s criminal
underworld is the first step toward deliberate,
informed action by the United States and Brazil
against a shifting criminal environment.

INTRODUCTION
The growth and internationalization of Brazil’s
organized crime groups are among the most
important developments in Latin America’s security and governance challenges of the past
decade. The emergence and dominance of
Brazilian groups that operate well beyond the
country’s borders present a major cause for
concern in the region. This paper examines
tectonic shifts in Brazil’s criminal underworld
starting in 2016. That year represents a watershed moment in Brazil’s criminal landscape because it saw the breakdown of a nearly 20-year,
nationwide truce between the warring criminal
factions First Capital Command (Primeiro Comando da Capital or PCC) and Red Command
(Comando Vermelho or CV). The resulting territorial disputes between the PCC and CV contributed to the most murderous year on record
in 2017, skyrocketing Brazil’s homicide figures
to more than 63,000 that year.1
As Brazil’s criminal organizations continue to
expand their operations domestically and internationally, violence has increased in many affected regions of the country—even amid the
COVID-19 pandemic in 2020.2 In particular, the
state of Amazonas is witnessing high levels of
contestation between rival factions and has
become the latest frontier in Brazil’s organized
crime landscape. The necessity to expand and
compete for territory, the geography of the region, shifting alliances between criminal organizations, and unique opportunities for market
diversification make the region the epicenter of
Brazil’s criminal contestation.
While Amazonas state was previously dominated by Brazil’s third-largest criminal organization, the Northern Family (Família Do Norte
or FDN), the faction has been severely weakened by the arrival of the CV, and now the PCC.

In May 2018, an agreement with the FDN’s
erstwhile ally, the CV, broke down, and in July
2019, the FDN suffered further fractures with
an offshoot group and a chain of grisly prison massacres. In the vacuum left by the FDN’s
rapid retreat, Brazil’s main criminal organizations have been fiercely contesting control of
Amazonas state in a “tussle for the Amazon.”
While Brazil’s criminal organizations have long
operated in that region, the current moment of
expansion is unique owing to the intensity of
the conflict and shifting criminal dynamics between groups across Brazil.
Amazonas state is an attractive territory for
Brazil’s criminal organizations because its
unique characteristics lend themselves to
criminal expansion and access to important
segments of the illicit market. The region’s
remoteness, combined with a lack of robust
state institutions, presents an attractive milieu
for criminal activity. Further, the geography
of Amazonas state offers a major advantage.
A sizeable network of unguarded rivers and
tributaries in the Amazon River Basin provides
unfettered opportunities to transport cocaine
produced in Colombia and Peru—the two largest coca producers in the world—to ports on
the Atlantic Ocean. In particular, the Solimões
River flows through the Brazil-Colombia-Peru
tri-border area, connecting with the mouth of
the Atlantic Ocean in one uninterrupted stretch
of several thousand miles.
Moreover, Amazonas state represents the opportunity for increased market diversification
because criminal organizations can take advantage of illicit activities beyond drug trafficking,
such as illegal mining, illegal logging, and the
illegal wildlife trade, to expand their illicit revenue streams. In addition to the FDN’s implosion,
the manifold opportunities in Amazonas state
have pulled first the CV and now the PCC like a
magnet to the region, violently contesting control and convulsing the criminal underworld.
Two main prongs of research emerge in the
context of these developments. First, what is
the present status of criminal contestation in
Amazonas state? Second, given the intensity
of past contestation, what possible scenarios
might Brazil expect to experience in the coming
years? The burgeoning capabilities of Brazil’s
principal organized crime groups and the concomitant internationalization of their operations
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make understanding the “tussle for the Amazon” urgent for Brazil and the entire Western
Hemisphere.
The paper will proceed in four parts. First, it
offers a synopsis of the main criminal organizations involved in the “tussle for the Amazon” and explains their nexus to Brazil’s prison
system. Second, the paper outlines the current
criminal landscape, including recent trends in
criminal expansion since the breakdown of the
truce between the CV and the PCC. Third, the
paper focuses on the particulars of the “tussle
for the Amazon.” Fourth, the report concludes
by offering several policy recommendations
for the United States and Brazil to stymie this
breakneck criminal expansion.

BRAZILIAN ORGANIZED CRIME
GROUPS
With the exception of the CV, most of Brazil’s organized crime groups were born in the country’s
post-dictatorship period, when the government
aimed to reform and modernize prisons but ultimately lacked the political support to do so.
Consequently, Brazil’s prison system relied on
antiquated practices throughout the 1980s
and 1990s that included solitary confinement
coupled with violent prison guards subject to
little accountability.3 Brazilian organized crime
groups have increased their appeal by positioning themselves against the state and purporting
to place the fight for better prison conditions at
the center of their operating ideologies.
From the 1980s to the present, three groups
have distinguished themselves as some of the
largest, most organized, and most ambitious organized crime groups in Brazil today: the PCC,
CV, and FDN. Militia groups whose ranks are
filled partly by former police officers (and members of dismantled criminal organizations) often
contest the power of Brazil’s organized crime
groups by extorting locals and controlling territory. This paper, however, will focus its analysis
on the PCC, CV, and FDN.
Brazil’s criminal organizations have always
maintained an important nexus with the country’s prisons and its criminal justice system,
with more than 80 prison-based groups known
to operate throughout the country.4 With nearly
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800,000 prisoners, Brazil has the third-highest prison population in the world.5 In a region
known for poorly run prison systems, Brazil’s
stands out for its mismanagement, violence,
overcrowded facilities, corruption, and lack
of health services. It should not be surprising, therefore, that Brazil’s criminal groups are
prison-based by nature, meaning that prisons
and the prison experience remain central to the
groups’ identities, and most of their top leaders
are incarcerated—even as they maintain an impressive level of control over street-level members. Brazil’s criminal groups manage to command street-level soldiers operating beyond the
prison gate because they have accrued enough
power within the country’s prisons to impact
the daily lives of prisoners; showing loyalty on
the outside could be critical to receiving favorable treatment on the inside. Prisons are thus
an important node in Brazil’s organized crime
landscape. It is where the three most powerful criminal groups began, matured, and continue to operate their headquarters.6 The fight
against transnational organized crime in Brazil
does not end with the act of incarceration. It
only begins there.
In this context, Brazil’s criminal groups have
capitalized on the vulnerabilities of the country’s prisons and leveraged them into critical
assets.7 Prisoners often rely on friends and
family to provide essentials, but criminal groups
can step into the void and offer material goods
with the profits from illicit activity.8 They also
permit families the opportunity to visit incarcerated members in far-away prisons and often pay members’ legal fees. As Graham Denyer
Willis explains, in the neighborhoods where they
operate, these groups also provide rudimentary
forms of security and governance that are not
provided by the formal institutions of the state.
He contends, “Police, forever seen as unreliable,
unaccountable, violent, and/or corrupt, have
been replaced by a social order complete with
its own norms, notions of justice, and modes of
punishment.”9
The power of Brazil’s organized crime groups is
thus considerable and only growing. The three
best articulated criminal groups—the PCC, the CV,
and the FDN—have long histories in Brazil. Their
current capabilities and areas of operation spring
partly from these histories. What follows is a
thumbnail sketch of each group and an estimation
of its current capacity and area of operation.
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Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC)
Originating in São Paulo, the PCC was established in the early 1990s, a product of eight
inmates in Taubaté prison. The group arose in
the aftermath of prison riots to offer internal
protection for inmates who suffered violence
at the hands of prison guards.10 By 2002, the
PCC’s long-time leader, Marcos Willians Herbas Camacho (alias “Marcola”), took over leadership, despite having been imprisoned since
1999. Marcola, a skilled bank robber in his day,
brought his criminal acumen to the group and
quickly turned it toward organized crime.
The PCC maintains the ability to operate from
inside and outside Brazil’s prisons, which it has
demonstrated time and again. For instance, in
May 2006, after Marcola and other PCC leaders were transferred to maximum-security facilities, inmates rebelled in more than 70 state
prisons and coordinated attacks by street-level
operatives on police stations and urban infrastructure, resulting in over 50 assassinations of
police officers.11
The rapid expansion of the PCC has caused
tectonic shifts in South America’s organized
crime scene. By 2017, the PCC had a countrywide presence in Brazil—nearly all 26 states
and the Federal District—and a burgeoning international position. Further, the PCC has perhaps the most extensive reach of any criminal
group in South America, and its considerable
scope means its drug trafficking operations
stretch from Paraguay and Bolivia in the south
to Peru and Colombia in the north. This position has afforded the PCC the role of top cocaine exporter from South America to Africa
and Europe.
With the help of its estimated 30,000 members,
the PCC exercises significant control over Brazil’s porous borders. In rural, lightly-guarded
areas, it controls the flow of drugs and weapons. After contraband enters Brazil, the PCC ferries goods to one of the many ports it controls,
such as Fortaleza, Santos, or Suape. From there,
drugs and weapons head to Africa or Europe.12
This expansive network operates in a decentralized fashion, in which it can maximize profits from its drug trafficking network by driving
down overall cost through a process of competitive bidding for individual street-level groups to
gain the right to sell PCC products.13 The PCC

has benefitted from being the most organized
and efficient of Brazil’s criminal organizations in
terms of its internal governance.14
Comando Vermelho (CV)
The CV is the oldest and, by most accounts,
the largest criminal group in Rio de Janeiro
state. Like the PCC, it began from behind bars.
The group traces its origins back to 1979 in
the maximum-security prison on Ilha Grande,
Candido Mendes, off the southern coast of Rio
de Janeiro. Outside of the prison walls, the CV
operates mostly out of several large favelas in
Rio de Janeiro, such as the Alemão complex in
the northern zone of the city. Its membership
spread to favelas across Rio de Janeiro state
after the fall of Brazil’s dictatorship in 1985,
when the country released many CV prisoners.15 Since then, the CV has been involved in
transnational drug trafficking, importing cocaine from Colombia and exporting it to Europe
and Africa. The group was the target of a police pacification program in Rio de Janeiro, but
following the cessation of pacification efforts,
it expanded throughout Brazil and beyond. The
CV’s main leaders, including the late Marcinho
VP, command the group from prison.16
Even though the CV may count fewer members
than the PCC across Brazil, the group had nearly 24,000 members as of 2017, with between
3,000 and 8,000 in Rio de Janeiro state and
an additional 16,000 in the rest of Brazil.17 Its
growing presence across the country is due, in
part, to its increasingly consolidated position in
Amazonas state in the last few years. The CV’s
alliance with the FDN from 2015 to 2018 helped
solidify its presence in Amazonas state. The
CV’s presence was bolstered further by several
key defections, most importantly that of Gelson
Carnaúba (alias “Mano G”), one of the founders
of the FDN, who switched sides and now heads
the CV in Amazonas state.18
By 2020, police estimates indicated that the CV
controlled more than 80 percent of the neighborhoods in Manaus, the capital of Amazonas
state.19 Current government reports estimate
that the CV has grown exponentially in numbers
in both Amazonas state and neighboring Acre
state.20 In contrast to the decentralized structure of the PCC, the CV employs a much more
rigid, hierarchical model of territorial control.21

6

Família do Norte (FDN)
The FDN was created by José Roberto Fernandes Barbosa (alias “Zé Roberto da Compensa”),
and Carnaúba. Unlike the PCC and CV, created
in highly urban contexts after prison riots in the
1980s and 1990s, the FDN was established in
Amazonas state in 2007 with the objective of
controlling the major tributaries of the Amazon
River. Despite its regional focus, the FDN gained
countrywide notoriety after the Brazilian Federal Police and Public Ministry discovered through
Operation La Muralla, launched in 2015, that
the FDN had built similar organizational structures as the PCC and the CV. After constructing
an internal bureaucracy capable of governing
the group’s activities both inside and outside
of prisons, Operation La Muralla found that the
FDN had consolidated near-absolute control
over the prison system in Amazonas state.22
In three weeks of intense violence, the FDN catapulted into the Brazilian public consciousness
in 2017 with a spate of gruesome prison massacres in Amazonas state that left nearly 100
prisoners dead.23 The FDN, together with its
former ally, the CV, carried out murders of PCC
leaders when efforts by the state to broker a
truce failed.24 Beginning in 2015, with the PCC’s
advancement into the FDN’s stronghold in Amazonas state, the FDN’s objectives were amplified to include containment of the PCC’s advances in the region. To bolster its effort against
the PCC in Amazonas state, the FDN enlisted the
partnership of the CV in an official alliance from
2015 to 2018, which broke down after internal
disagreements between the groups’ founders.25
Following the dissolution of the FDN’s alliance
with the CV, the group suffered internal fractures. João Branco, a former senior member of
FDN, founded the Pure Northern Family (Família
Do Norte Pura or FDNP) after the FDN lost influence within prisons and competition from
rivals diminished its revenue from drug sales.
The FDNP became a splinter group with the sole
aim of eliminating the remnants of the FDN.
From a federal prison in Paraná, southern Brazil, Branco corralled FDN members loyal to him
in Amazonas state and urged them to eliminate
the group’s leadership. This sparked an intense
internecine conflict between the FDN and the
FDNP after the command leaked, leading to the
death of more than 55 prisoners.26
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Attrition, internal fissures, and competition from
outside groups have eroded the FDN’s former
potency. While it is less relevant than it once
was, at its height, the FDN was possibly the
second largest criminal organization in Brazil,
with as many as 13,000 members.27 The remnants of the group seek to expand and consolidate control of drug-trafficking routes in Amazonas state; however, since February 2020, its
stronghold in the state of Amazonas has mostly
been taken over by the CV. The most concerning clash in Amazonas state is now between the
PCC and the CV. As this rivalry between old foes
intensifies, the FDN is likely to be permanently
vanquished.28

CRIMINAL EXPANSION
Since the unraveling of the two-decade, nationwide truce between the PCC and the CV in 2016,
Brazil’s criminal organizations have accelerated
their criminal expansion throughout the country, the rest of South America, and even beyond
the Western Hemisphere. As the largest criminal organization in Brazil, the PCC has been
at the forefront of Brazil’s international criminal expansion. The PCC possesses the largest
market for drug trafficking operations in South
America, extending well beyond the region into
the United States, Africa, and Western Europe.
However, the PCC is not the only criminal organization expanding its global reach. Its main
rival, the CV, has mobilized its efforts toward
controlling Amazonas state and has expanded
its drug trafficking operations to include a major
drug route connecting Brazil to Colombia and
Peru, and eventually, the Atlantic Ocean.29
Brazil’s criminal organizations continue to seek
control over drug routes that facilitate the illicit
trafficking of cocaine and marijuana, among other
illicit goods, both within Brazil and internationally.
The expansion of these drug trafficking operations and the ensuing turf wars have contributed
to a large increase in armed conflict in Brazil. In
their efforts to establish control over territory, rival criminal factions ensconced in a complex ecosystem of shifting alliances contribute to an increase in violent confrontations between groups.
Due to the highly profitable nature of these drug
routes, Brazil’s criminal organizations continue to
strengthen their power in the country.30
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While Brazil does not produce cocaine or grow
its precursors, it has evolved into one of the
most important players in trafficking cocaine
internationally from the epicenter of coca cultivation in Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia. Brazil
now serves as the principal thoroughfare for
the transit of cocaine and other drugs in South
America to markets in Africa and Western Europe.31 According to data from the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, in 2017, Brazil
had the fifth-largest cocaine and marijuana seizures in the world by volume.32
Since the termination of the 2016 truce, Brazil’s
criminal organizations have continued to expand their drug trafficking operations through
increased recruitment efforts and violent tactics that cross the borders of neighboring countries. The expansion of these criminal organizations into other countries presents a notable
transformation in the criminal landscape of the
region, with Brazil’s criminal factions disrupting
governance and security in much of the continent, stretching from Colombia to Paraguay.
Through both corruption and coercion, criminal organizations such as the PCC and CV can
penetrate weak state institutions, even in foreign prison and criminal justice systems.33 Even
the coronavirus pandemic has been unable to
impede criminal expansion in Brazil; in fact, in
many ways, the pandemic accelerated the current expansionary trends.34
The 2020 apprehension of Marcola’s top lieutenant, Gilberto Aparecido dos Santos (alias
“Fuminho”)—a man on Brazil’s “Most Wanted”
list who ran international drug trafficking operations for the PCC—by the Brazilian Federal
Police and U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration in Mozambique is further evidence of the
PCC’s international expansion efforts.35 Fuminho’s presence in Lusophone Africa, 5,000 miles
away from the PCC’s stronghold, demonstrates
that the group has turned its attention to markets on other continents, given that it has already established itself as the most prominent
criminal organization in South America with a
burgeoning presence in nearly every country.36
However, Fuminho’s arrest will make the PCC’s
international criminal expansion much more
challenging moving forward, even though it has
managed to maintain organizational cohesion.
As the coordinator for drug trafficking operations in Bolivia and the PCC member with the
most international experience, his expertise and

level of trust with Marcola will prove difficult to
replace. Nevertheless, the PCC has consolidated its international operations in Paraguay and
Bolivia and likely has plans to continue building
on Fuminho’s efforts for ambitious international
expansion.
Similarly, the CV views international expansion
as crucial to its long-term survival as an organization. Last year, the Brazilian government
reported that the CV hired African and Eastern
European mercenaries with military experience
to come to Rio de Janeiro state and conduct
training exercises as the organization expands
its violent tactics within Brazil and internationally.37 With international assistance, the CV aims
to establish control over domestic territory and
pursue expansion into international markets.
For instance, increasing returns in the European
cocaine market are fueling part of this desire3
for criminal expansion on an international scale.
Europe recently became the top destination for
drug exports from Brazil, witnessing a 20 percent increase in seizures at European ports of
entry in 2020.38 Brazilian criminal groups have
come to understand market dynamics and realize that Europe is a much more lucrative
and less competitive market than the United
States, as evidenced by the price of one kilogram of cocaine being worth US$28,000 in the
United States versus between US$40,000 and
US$80,000 in the European market.39
Much of the violence in Brazil over the last few
years has been fueled by the clashes between
Brazil’s organized crime groups in their pursuit
of criminal expansion, driven by the logic of survival as well as market dynamics. The breakdown
of the longstanding, 20-year truce between the
PCC and CV has intensified the conflict between
Brazil’s largest criminal factions as they compete to control the same lucrative stretches of
territory. The major uptick in violence in Brazil
that coincided with the end of this truce is related to renewed and reinvigorated conflict between these groups. While 2017 was the country’s most murderous year on record, wherein
Brazil registered more than 63,000 homicides,
violence has continued at alarming rates as
criminal expansion throughout Brazil continues
unabated. Amazonas state represents only the
latest frontier in this long-running conflict, providing criminal groups with the most opportunity for growth.
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The Amazon is the New Frontier
Amazonas state has a tremendous potential for
criminal expansion, and several timely factors
will intensify competition for control of the region in the coming years. The increasing futility
of former alliance structures between different
criminal groups along with the implosion of the
FDN in February 2020—historically the most
dominant group in the Amazon—have transformed the region into one of the central hubs
of criminal expansion in Brazil. After the termination of the 2016 truce between the PCC and
the CV, the FDN formed an alliance with the CV
in Amazonas state to contain the PCC’s growing
strength. However, after internal disputes within
the FDN over its alliance structure and the best
path forward for the organization’s continued
survival in Amazonas state, the alliance with the
CV came to a roaring halt in May 2018.40 Further,
a weakened FDN also suffered from internal
disputes and mutinies. FDN founder Carnaúba,
who was behind the original alliance with the
CV, switched allegiances from the FDN to the CV
after the agreement he negotiated came to an
end.41 These events have forced the FDN to retreat under highly inauspicious conditions.
The implosion of the FDN has left a vacuum
of territory for other criminal organizations to
vie for a stronghold in Amazonas state. Naturally, contention between the CV and the PCC
has increased significantly over this tantalizing prospect. In addition to the futility of erstwhile alliance structures and the implosion of
the FDN, the Amazon region is primed for intense competition because of its unique characteristics, which lend it considerable strategic importance. Amazonas state has access to
important drug trafficking routes originating in
Colombia and Peru via its extensive network of
Amazon River tributaries. These areas present
extremely challenging terrain for the Brazilian
state to guard in a region already characterized
by a paucity of resources. The combination of
shifting dynamics between Brazil’s criminal organizations and the strategic importance of the
Amazon has contributed to a sizable increase in
violence and contestation.
Between 2017 and 2019, the PCC appeared
to have most of the momentum in the push
to consolidate territorial control in Amazonas
state. However, the CV has managed to catch
up quickly and even surpass the PCC in many
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areas. The gradual victories won by the CV in
Amazonas state have come at the expense of
the PCC and its local partners, in addition to the
FDN. For instance, the CV has worked to displace Bonde dos 13 (B13), a local criminal group
and PCC ally, to secure control over drug routes
from Peru.42
Starting in mid-2019 and continuing into
2020—and even during the coronavirus pandemic—the CV’s efforts to wrest back control
made significant inroads in the region. Like the
PCC’s earlier gains, and in accordance with its
prison-based nature, a series of grisly prison massacres presaged the CV’s advances,
not only in Amazonas but throughout Brazil’s
northern states. As the PCC advanced in January 2017, 101 prisoners were killed in a week
of violent riots in three different prisons. The
macabre history would repeat itself. As the CV
advanced in late May 2019, around 57 inmates
were killed at four different prison facilities in
Amazonas state over three days, most of them
in the capital of Manaus.43 What followed was
just as harrowing. In late July 2019, 57 prisoners were executed—with some beheaded—in
the Altamira prison as the PCC and CV squared
off again.44
The CV’s opening salvo in the Amazon also contributed to an uptick in brutal murders and executions outside prison walls. At the height of
the CV’s campaign in January 2020, murders
in Manaus increased 54 percent over the same
period the year before.45 The CV transplanted
its trademark ruthlessness in its strategy to
displace local groups, often issuing an ultimatum—convert to the CV or join the clergy in the
evangelical church. The CV has managed to directly confront the FDN on its territory in Amazonas state, practically relegating it to obscurity with its confrontational and violent tactics.
The addition of Carnaúba to the CV’s ranks has
helped the group to take further control of Amazonas state, while the FDN has imploded.
In the city of Manaus, the largest urban area in
the Amazon region, the base of the FDN, and
an important holdout in the CV’s concerted onslaught, entire neighborhoods have been violently wrested from the FDN’s control.46 Fireworks displays often mark the end of raucous
gun battles and, thus, the acquisition of new
territory by the CV. The most recent example of
the CV’s violence occurred in June 2021, with
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dozens of explosive attacks on government
buildings and vehicles in Manaus. Because one
of the CV’s leaders in the Amazon region, Erick
Batista (alias “Dadinho”), was killed by police
on June 5, the group is thought to have been
behind the attack as retribution.47 As a consequence of the CV’s concerted efforts, the FDN
lost approximately 80 percent of its territory in
Manaus. By the end of 2020, the CV had become the dominant criminal organization in the
Amazon region.48
Competition between Brazil’s most prominent
criminal organizations has also bred lucrative
options for smaller groups to ally themselves
and contract their services. Ambitious groups
such as the B13 have prospered in the region
as a proxy operating on behalf of the PCC.49
Local and proxy groups have demonstrated a
nascent capacity to project power into Amazonas state, and more importantly, have served
to replicate and amplify the rivalries of larger
Brazilian groups in hitherto untouched corners
of the region.
In the topsy-turvy environment that is the criminal underworld in Amazonas state, Zé Roberto
da Compensa, the leader of the FDN, proposed
forming an alliance with the PCC in 2020 to save
his faltering organization and rebuff the CV’s
territorial gains more effectively. Owing to their
historical rivalry, the PCC’s leadership is reportedly divided over the offer, and any agreement
would require the FDN to eliminate the remaining leaders involved in an earlier massacre of
PCC members in the Compaj prison in 2017.50 If
an alliance does come to fruition, it could presage another major uptick in criminal violence.
When the PCC’s setbacks are put into broader
context, the current trends appear to present
a turning point for the CV’s criminal empire and
indeed the broader criminal landscape in Brazil. However, the PCC’s setbacks in Amazonas
state have been partly offset by gains in corruption networks throughout the country and
more effective money-laundering strategies.51
Competition in Amazonas state for control of
the broader Amazon region will remain intense
amid the shifting dynamics of Brazil’s criminal
groups. In January 2020, there were 106 homicides in Manaus, the capital of Amazonas, a
54 percent increase over the same period the
year before, according to official figures from
the Brazilian Ministry of Justice and Public Se-

curity.52 The broader Amazon region will remain
the key battleground between rival factions in
Brazil’s complex criminal landscape.

THE TUSSLE FOR THE AMAZON
Complexity arises when competing criminal organizations in a defined social space look to
create illicit governance and operate in an illegal
economic market. In the case of Brazil’s Amazon
region, it is increasingly clear that the clash between factions owes to an overlapping set of
economic and social interests for the control of
a highly profitable drug trafficking route.53 Brazil’s leading criminal organizations in Amazonas
state have tailored their governance strategies
in a region where the state has difficulty maintaining authority because of its size, geography,
remoteness, and even outright negligence. As
the PCC and CV expand their domestic and international operations, the “tussle for the Amazon” will continue to be an intense conflict for
lasting control. While the timing of this conflict
owes mostly to the shifting dynamics between
Brazil’s criminal organizations, the strategic importance of Amazonas state further explains the
intense clashes for control over this territory.
Specifically, the following five reasons explain
why Amazonas state is such a coveted territory
in the realm of Brazil’s criminal underworld:
1) The lucrative Solimões route to the Atlantic
2) Access to the triple border with Colombia
and Peru: The largest coca producers in
the world
3) The “Rota Caipira” of the south is increasingly consolidated and dominated by the
PCC
4) Ungoverned spaces abound in the Amazon
5) Market diversification: From drugs to illegal mining, deforestation, and wildlife
trafficking
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1) The Lucrative Solimões Route
to the Atlantic

companies hiring armed security to protect
their boats.

In the last five years, Brazilian criminal organizations have dedicated themselves to controlling
the Solimões Route (Rota Solimões), a section
of the Amazon River that forms an ideal transportation network stemming from Peru and Colombia to the Atlantic Ocean. This cocaine trafficking route, composed of a series of largely
unguarded rivers originating in the Amazon, is
one of the most important in the world for the
illicit drug market. The Solimões Route consists
of thousands of small rivers and canals that
wind their way through remote stretches of the
Amazon region that are practically undetectable
by the Brazilian state, providing a golden route
for illicit drug shipment. The Solimões Route
provides drug trafficking organizations a nearly
uninterrupted path from the Pacific to the Atlantic—akin to a “Latin American Silk Road” for
drug trafficking.

In this context, criminal organizations such as
the PCC, CV, and FDN have been violently contesting control of the route. Although the PCC
and the CV maintained a presence in the Brazilian Amazon before 2016, both groups have
now set their sights on the region because of its
critical role in the illicit cocaine market via the
Solimões Route. Due to the necessity of controlling territory in an environment with shifting alliances, the Solimões Route has intensified clashes between these rival factions in the
Amazon. As domestic expansion becomes more
difficult, Brazilian criminal groups seek to expand their operations internationally, an objective that can be met with greater control of this
lucrative riverine. With an outlet to the Atlantic
Ocean, the Amazon region provides a unique location for drugs to pass on their way to Africa
and eventually to Europe.

Nearly 90 percent of the cocaine cultivated and manufactured worldwide originates in
Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia and subsequently
passes through the Solimões and Amazon rivers.54 The Solimões provides criminal organizations not only direct access to the Atlantic
but also links the Amazon region with the important port cities of Brazil’s northeast region,
such as Belém in Pará state and Fortaleza in
Ceará state, from which drugs can continue
to their final destination hidden aboard containers on large cargo ships. Thus, by virtue of
several tributary rivers, the Solimões serves as
an essential drug trafficking route for Brazil’s
criminal groups seeking to exploit this lucrative channel in the global market.

Law enforcement attempts to patrol the illicit
drug market on the Solimões Route have been
met by difficulties in tracking Brazil’s sundry
criminal organizations. Even though controlling
the vast network of rivers along the Solimões
is a challenging endeavor, the Brazilian government has noted the supply of illicit drug trafficking on the route and, in response, mobilized
the expansion of Program VIGIA (Programa Nacional de Segurança nas Fronteiras e Divisas).
Program VIGIA is a 2019 initiative launched by
the Ministry of Justice and Public Security to
tackle illicit business activities on Brazil’s borders by increasing collaboration between federal and state law enforcement agencies. After
growing awareness of the Solimões Route, the
program established a floating operational base
in the Solimões River in August 2020 with communication towers and water vehicles that work
to disrupt drug trafficking routes throughout
the Amazon.56 Despite these efforts by the Brazilian state, the Solimões will continue to retain
its importance and serve as a flashpoint in the
increasing conflict between criminal organizations in the Amazon region.

The remote and unguarded nature of the Solimões River is particularly attractive, as it allows for increased and mixed methods of illicit
drug trafficking in the Amazon. Criminal organizations use unique methods to evade police
detection, although minimal law enforcement
is present in the Amazon. For instance, cocaine
traffickers moving product from Colombia and
Peru to Brazil (and eventually to the Atlantic
Ocean) can use slower and larger boats at times
to avoid being caught by the police, rather than
relying on rapid motorboats to navigate the rivers.55 In addition to a lack of state security presence, contestation between criminal groups on
the Solimões River has resulted in many local
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2) Access to the Triple Border with Colombia
and Peru: The Largest Coca Producers in the
World
Illicit market dynamics and local geographies
rather than individual leaders have driven much
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of the expansionary push affecting the daily
lives of millions of people living in the Amazon
region, as evidenced by the triple border with
Colombia and Peru (as well as the lawlessness
in Venezuela, which is an important transshipment country with ready access to Caribbean
trafficking routes). While the Solimões Route in
and of itself is a lucrative aspect of the Amazon,
one of the main implications of control in this region is access to the triple border between Brazil in the east, Colombia in the north, and Peru in
the west. Colombia and Peru are the two largest
coca-cultivating countries in the world.57 Moreover, the coca produced in Colombia and Peru is
of higher quality than that produced in Bolivia,
the third-largest cultivator in the world. As such,
Brazilian criminal groups are increasingly seeking to capitalize on the attractive market that
control of the triple border would furnish. This
region consists of highly porous borders and
poorly governed spaces that facilitate transnational trafficking flows. These features inherent
to the region’s geography increase the intensity of the competition for ultimate control of a
trafficking route that allows criminal groups to
serve a much broader clientele, which includes
Europe, Africa, and the Middle East.
The PCC’s early control of a position near the triple border of Brazil, Colombia, and Peru served
as a crucial step in its expansion plan in 2017.
After the 2016 peace deal between the Colombian state and the guerrilla group Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC), the
PCC collaborated with dissident FARC groups to
better understand local trafficking routes and
to integrate into supply chains for coca production in this northern region of Amazonas state.58
This alliance with FARC dissidents gave the PCC
a competitive advantage in the “tussle for the
Amazon” over both the CV and the FDN. Further, the FARC’s demobilization, together with
the explosion of Colombia’s coca production
following the cessation of aerial fumigation
efforts, allowed the PCC to benefit immensely
from the increasing amounts of cocaine pouring
across Brazil’s northern border.59 There are also
possibilities for Brazilian criminal groups to collaborate with Colombian BACRIM (Bandas Criminales), another generation of drug trafficking
organizations, which highlights the increasing
competition for drug trafficking routes on multiple sides of the triple border.60

The triple border is hotly contested because
other border areas with similar geographic
features and the potential for illicit economic
activity have been consolidated. Brazil’s other tri-border area, the southern portion of the
country that meets Argentina and Paraguay,
has been soundly in the PCC’s possession for
years. Combined with its robust operations in
Paraguay and Bolivia—the “Rota Caipira” (Caipira Route) for drug trafficking—the PCC’s establishment of stable, consolidated operations
in the Amazon’s triple border area would be a
potentially fatal blow to the CV’s ambitions.61 A
northern route for drug export would increase
the PCC’s monopoly on drug trafficking operations throughout Brazil and decrease the risk of
enhanced law enforcement operations against
its southern route by providing it with a viable
and lucrative alternative.
Thus, it is no surprise that the CV has also
demonstrated its aspirations for gaining control
over the Amazonian triple border. For instance,
the CV’s objective in taking over the stronghold
in Acre state was to seize a drug route through
Peru from the PCC and its local ally in the region,
B13.62 Additionally, under Carnaúba, the FDN
was introduced by a former FARC member to a
leader of the Los Pelusos criminal group in Colombia. With Carnaúba now serving as the CV’s
leader in Amazonas state, the CV may be able
to capitalize on the pre-existing cross-border
relationships developed by Carnaúba with his
former organization. Even during the coronavirus pandemic, this intense turf battle continues
to play out, with each side using alliances with
local factions. Both the PCC and the CV continue
to make advances to consolidate control over
the triple border, a conflict that shows no signs
of abating.
3) The “Rota Caipira” of the South is Increasingly Consolidated and Dominated by the PCC
While the triple border with Colombia and Peru
is becoming increasingly more competitive for
control of the Solimões Route and its nearly
unfettered access to the largest cocaine producers in the world, the “Rota Caipira” has been
consolidated as a PCC stronghold in the south of
Brazil with established connections for the cocaine produced in Bolivia and the drug trafficking routes in Paraguay. This route crosses from
Bolivia and Paraguay into the Brazilian state of
Mato Grosso do Sul and ultimately into the state
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of São Paulo, where it can be trafficked across
the Atlantic from the port of Santos, the largest
in South America.63 The PCC’s dominance in this
southern region, which abuts its home state of
São Paulo, has forced the CV to focus its efforts increasingly on the Solimões Route in the
northern stretches of Amazonas state as one
of the best remaining domestic opportunities
to continue the criminal expansion of its drug
trafficking enterprise.64 The consolidated nature of the PCC’s criminal empire in Bolivia and
Paraguay has significant transnational security
implications for the entire region, as it pushes
Brazilian criminal groups away from the south to
continue to vie for illicit markets in the northern
Amazonas state instead.
Bolivia has served as one of the main expansion points for the PCC’s international campaign
along the “Rota Caipira” due to its status as a
cocaine production hub. The PCC has invested
considerable resources in the country, including members of its leadership team that have
assisted in spearheading efforts on the ground.
With an established presence in the country,
the PCC has used Bolivian equipment and explosives to perform hundreds of bank heists
and ATM lootings in Brazil and Bolivia. Expansion efforts in Bolivia have been successful, as
evidenced by the PCC’s control over the local
supply chain of coca production in Bolivia’s
Chapare region. Moreover, the PCC also operates cocaine-processing laboratories near the
border with Brazil and continues to send operatives to Bolivia to protect the cultivation of
the coca crop. Its presence in Bolivia is unrivaled by any other criminal organization, and all
signs point to further dominance of the PCC in
the country, which would be complemented by
establishing control of the lucrative drug trafficking routes in the Amazon.
The PCC’s stronghold in Paraguay has also been
consolidated along the “Rota Caipira” and provides the group with access to Latin America’s
largest marijuana producer and a consolidated
route for the transit of Bolivian cocaine through
its territory and into Brazil.65 Paraguay alone
provides Brazil with at least 80 percent of its
marijuana consumption, a market in which the
PCC has well-established control.66 This market
was first sought out by the CV in the 1980s, led
by Luiz Fernando da Costa, alias Fernandinho
Beira-Mar, but since his arrest in 2002, the PCC
slowly began to wrest control of the region.67
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Since the assassination of Jorge Rafaat in June
2016, the PCC has stepped in to further consolidate the power vacuum left by the former
“King of the Border.”68 Similar to its operations in
Bolivia, the PCC has sent many of its members
to lead a PCC contingency in Paraguay, leading
to the arrest and replacement of many in that
country. Even though Paraguayan police recently arrested a top PCC leader, Giovanni Barbosa
da Silva (alias “Bonitão”) on January 9, 2021
in Pedro Juan Caballero, the PCC continues to
operate across the Paraguayan border without
much difficulty and has converted the country
into one of its primary bases for the supply of
marijuana.69 In both Bolivia and Paraguay, the
PCC has become the dominant criminal organization by establishing dominance over the
“Rota Caipira” and asserting its presence both
inside and outside of prisons.
4) Ungoverned Spaces Abound in the Amazon
The São Paulo-based PCC and Rio de Janeiro-based CV have found the ungoverned spaces in Amazonas state much easier to navigate
given the weakness of state institutions and the
lack of police forces along the region’s drug trafficking routes. Amazonas state’s ungoverned
spaces allow Brazil’s criminal groups to exert
authority over rural areas and provide an ideal location for criminal operations to go largely
unseen in the depths of the Amazon rainforest.
Groups are permitted to operate seamlessly
without significant interference from Brazilian
law enforcement. While the Brazilian government has attempted to ramp up its presence
along the Solimões by standing up Program VIGIA, the river’s length at over 1,000 miles and
the sheer scale of Amazonas state of more than
600,000 square miles are sufficient to frustrate
even the best efforts.
Because Amazonas and Acre states are more
rural than the rest of Brazil, political and security institutions are typically weaker and less
consolidated throughout these less inhabited
states. Brazil’s criminal organizations prosper in
these spaces and leverage the ability to play a
governing role by providing goods and services.
For instance, local citizens may equate the CV
with the state when the group exercises three
main forms of institutional authority: a monopoly on violence, socioeconomic security in
the form of providing goods and services, and
sociological legitimacy.70 In largely uninhabited
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stretches of the Amazon, these three forms of
authority are likely easier to implement since
institutional fragility in the region provides an
ideal platform for these groups to wrest authority from the state.
Furthermore, in ungoverned areas like Amazonas state, Brazil’s criminal organizations have
exercised what one writer describes as the concept of “strategic magnanimity.”71 Lacking daily
interaction with the state, citizens in these areas recognize that criminal organizations act as
a governing body by providing strategic goods
and services to the community, developing a
nascent form of tacit cooperation.72 In this arrangement, communities desire an organized
form of governance that criminal organizations
often furnish, and in exchange, citizens turn a
blind eye to the group’s illicit drug trafficking
operations. Besides facilitating their operations,
the proliferation of ungoverned spaces allows
Brazilian criminal groups to establish themselves as central arbiters over these rural regions, yielding a social legitimacy that complements the income derived from illicit economic
activity.
5) Market Diversification: From Drugs to Illegal Mining, Deforestation, and Wildlife
Trafficking
Another reason competition in Amazonas state
has intensified is the opportunity for additional
criminal expansion due to the potential market diversification the Amazon offers. While the
“Rota Caipira” is a route used almost exclusively
to ferry drugs, Amazonas state presents opportunities for market diversification as the region
naturally possesses a variety of illicit markets
for criminal organizations. In addition to drug
trafficking, other unlawful activities include illegal mining, illegal deforestation and the market
for timber, and illegal wildlife trafficking. Together with the ungoverned nature of the region, the
resources for illicit economies encourage Brazil’s criminal groups to expand their operations.
Illegal mining continues to grow significantly in
the Amazon region. It has been reported that
the PCC has been suspected of being hired to
protect mining fields through violent attacks
on Indigenous populations occurring as late as
June 2021.73 Specifically, in the northern state
of Roraima, violence has risen between illegal
miners and Indigenous Amazonian tribes, such

as the Yanomami. Furthermore, the Bolsonaro
administration continues to accelerate illegal
mining as an illicit market for Brazilian criminal
expansion as it eases mining regulations. But
even with greater political will to combat this illicit market, the Brazilian state simply does not
have the capacity to regulate it. Brazil’s National Mining Agency (Agência Nacional de Mineração or ANM) employs a mere 250 inspectors
to monitor more than 35,000 mining sites in the
country.74 The ANM is under-resourced and indicates a poor state capacity to regulate, even
at some of Brazil’s most prominent and commercial mining sites.75
In a similar fashion to illegal mining, the illegal deforestation in Amazonas state presents
another valuable opportunity for criminal expansion. The deforestation rate in the Brazilian region of the Amazon hit a 12-year high in
2020, with an estimated 11,088 km2, which is
182 percent higher than the 3,935 km2 target.76
Brazil’s criminal organizations contribute significantly to rising deforestation because the
logistical capacity these groups possess in the
region can be easily transferred to new markets
such as the illegal sale and export of timber.77
Moreover, the Bolsonaro administration’s lack
of support for legislation to protect the Amazon
rainforest facilitates the opportunities available
for criminal groups to continue expanding into
the illicit timber market.
Additionally, illegal wildlife trafficking in the Amazon has accelerated as another illicit market in
the latest moment of criminal expansion. Given
that the Amazon possesses over 13 percent of
the world’s biodiversity, Brazil has become an
important hub of wildlife trafficking.78 Criminal
organizations take advantage of the Solimões
route used for drug trafficking to smuggle wildlife in the region, including turtles, fish, jaguars,
bushmeat, and parrots. Along the triple border,
illegal wildlife trafficking has seen a significant
increase in the border towns of Tabatinga, Brazil
and Leticia, Colombia, specifically on the Purus,
Negro, and Madeira Rivers.79 Official figures for
illegal wildlife trafficking in Amazonas state are
difficult to assess with certainty; however, illegal
trading of parrots and other animals continues
to increase without meaningful pushback because of the ungoverned nature of the Amazon
rainforest.80 While Indigenous populations have
long hunted for bushmeat in Amazonas state
for the purpose of subsistence—a legal form of

14

hunting—criminal organizations have stepped
in to expand wildlife trafficking, leveraging existing smuggling routes for illicit narcotics.81

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
Given the strength of Brazil’s criminal organizations and the ungoverned spaces in the Amazon region, it seems unlikely the Bolsonaro
administration can eliminate further violence
and criminal expansion in the short term. Further, Bolsonaro’s poor handling of the COVID-19
pandemic has strengthened the appeal of the
PCC, CV, and other prison-based criminal organizations across the country.
Criminal expansion in the heart of the Amazon
region should be alarming for the U.S. government as well. The Biden administration could
use this as an opportunity to strengthen its engagement with Latin America’s largest country
and highlight the nexus between the activity of
criminal organizations and the issues of climate
change and deforestation.82 As such, American
and Brazilian policymakers in the Biden and
Bolsonaro administrations should work together to counter the “tussle for the Amazon” and
bolster Brazilian efforts to reduce violence and
unwind criminal networks in the Americas.
The following policy options do not form a comprehensive plan, but their pursuit would benefit
efforts to counter criminal expansion across the
Americas and increase U.S.-Brazil engagement.
While most of the recommendations feature
U.S.-Brazil cooperation, some imply Brazilian
domestic reform. In these cases, the United
States can still play a major role in shaping
policy through encouragement and providing
high-level assistance.
Recommendation 1: Counter Criminal Expansion Jointly in the Americas.
American and Brazilian policymakers should
work together to mitigate the expansion of
criminal activity in the Americas, which is in
both country’s interests, irrespective of political leadership. This alliance must aim to corral
powerful Latin American states, such as Colombia or Peru, to place a proper focus on transnational organized crime in our hemisphere. By
promoting strong leaders and strengthening
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regional fora like the Organization of American
States and its many organs, including its new
Department Against Transnational Organized
Crime, the United States and Brazil could begin
to stand up a group of countries willing to push
back against the existential threat posed by
criminal groups in the region. Countering criminal expansion in the Amazon would also provide
the Biden administration with an opportunity to
emphasize the overlap in its efforts, highlighted
in a recent Executive Order to combat corruption and build stronger democratic institutions
as a core concern of national security and combat climate change in a strategically important
context in the Western Hemisphere.83
Recommendation 2: Leverage Brazil’s Major
Non-NATO Ally Status to Engage in Relevant
Forms of Security Cooperation, Military Exercises, and Equipment Transfers.
During President Jair Bolsonaro’s visit to Washington in March 2019, then-President Donald
J. Trump designated Brazil a “major non-NATO
ally” (MNNA).84 Brazil seeks closer ties to the
United States beyond the unique Trump-Bolsonaro moment, and a closer relationship between the country’s armed forces is one potential avenue to deepen it. Besides serving
as a powerful symbol of a close relationship,
MNNA status confers several important benefits, including possible coordination on military
missions, expedited access to sensitive technology, and the opportunity to conduct joint
training exercises. While some of the privileges accorded to Brazil through MNNA status are
likely non-starters owing to historical sensitivities, the United States can play a prominent
role in relevant equipment transfers and assisting Brazil in modernizing its forces to combat
criminal organizations operating on its territory.
Access to sensitive intelligence-sharing could
also bolster Brazil’s operational capacity in rural
areas where the PCC and CV operate. Stitching
together a complete picture of Brazil’s criminal
organizations and their international operations
is an important component of reversing the
gains they have made in recent years.
Recommendation 3: Counter Illicit Finance.
While Brazil’s criminal organizations continue
to expand operations throughout Latin America and the world, one key inhibiting factor that
separates them from the drug cartels in Mexi-
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co or Colombia is a lack of financial savvy. The
CV, and especially the PCC, have demonstrated impressive levels of internal organization;
however, they have yet to develop the financial
management strategies necessary to leverage
all the resources at their disposal for criminal
expansion. Counter-threat finance activities
will be critical in preventing Brazil’s criminal groups from advancing and consolidating
the financial component of their operations.
At the end of 2019, the Bolsonaro administration successfully pushed for the passage
of a sweeping anti-crime bill, which included,
among other tools, enhanced authorities to
combat money laundering.85
First, the 3+1 Group on Tri-Border Security established in 2002 among Argentina, Brazil, and
Paraguay (with the United States being the
“+1”), should become a key forum to discuss
financial security in the region. Because the
tri-border area between Brazil, Argentina, and
Paraguay is of paramount importance for the
PCC, the United States should work to revive the
3+1 group as a method for ensuring financial
systems remain vigilant in their supervision of
illicit finance.

many territories of the Amazon, including indigenous territories.87 Without stronger enforcement mechanisms, an expansion of legal mining
in the region would likely be a windfall for Brazil’s criminal groups, which already exploit the
ANM’s poor state capacity to regulate.
The United States must continue to encourage
Brazil and work alongside it wherever possible
to deliver on its climate goals and ensure that
the country does not lose sight of the nexus between the operations of criminal organizations
and environmental crime. By protecting the environment in this manner, Brazil could protect
the Amazon rainforest from deforestation and
simultaneously close off opportunities for criminal expansion that are currently permitted by
Brazil’s policies on the Amazon.

Another crucial tool for preventing Brazil’s criminal groups from consolidating illicit financial
know-how is the Egmont Group of Financial
Intelligence Units. Groups such as Brazil’s PCC
are transitioning from first-generation money
laundering strategies to more sophisticated efforts.86 Front companies with a patina of legitimacy represent the latest strategies, especially those involving the ability to rapidly convert
currencies and send money to overseas bank
accounts.
Recommendation 4: Increase Enforcement of
Environmental Law Violations in the Amazon.
At the domestic level, the Brazilian government
can pursue the dual objective of protecting the
Amazon rainforest and reducing opportunities
for market diversification, which drives much
of Brazil’s “tussle for the Amazon.” Violence in
the Amazon has increased during the tenure
of Bolsonaro, partly due to a lack of enforcement of environmental law and the corruption
and impunity bred from an inability to punish
clear violations. To reduce criminal expansion
in the Amazon, the Brazilian government should
reform legislation that would legalize mining in
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